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Curious Worm Ransomware

Group Overview

Red Piranha identifies Curious Worm as a data-theft extortion group: it publishes stolen files on a dark-web leak site, and no file encryption, ransom note or malware has been seen. Public monitoring services ('trackers') first recorded its leak site on 11 November 2026 with nine organisations already listed, and a tenth was added on 12 November, so all ten fall in this reporting window. Ransomware.live and RansomLook list it as 'Curious Worm', and one vendor tracker classes it as a 'data broker' first seen in October 2026. By their company profiles, all ten are US organisations: eight in healthcare or healthcare supply, one law firm and one chemical manufacturer. [1][2][3] 

Nothing links Curious Worm to an earlier group. No vendor has published an analysis; the site carries no statement, contact address or affiliate offer. One of the ten, a senior-care provider, was listed under the same company name by the Lynx ransomware group in October 2025 after an intrusion that year; the files Curious Worm holds for it include a database backup whose file name carries 25 October 2026, so this appears to be new data and not a re-post. Red Piranha assesses lineage as UNKNOWN. [1][2][5] 

No incident-response report, victim statement or operator statement exists, so the pattern rests on what the leak server shows. Each listing download link opens a plain directory listing of the stolen files. The folders are named internal file-server shares and department drives, and one victim folder holds two full SQL Server database backups of 121 GB and 7 GB. That points to access deep inside each network, to file servers and database servers, and not only to an internet-facing application. [1][2] 

The timestamps on the leak server run from 21 October to 12 November 2026, so data was being loaded for three weeks before trackers first captured the site on 11 November. The site has a countdown field for listings not yet released, but none was running. No ransom figure, deadline, payment address or negotiation channel is visible, so any demand was made privately. No victim has confirmed an incident. [1][2][3] 

Technical Analysis

No malware sample, ransom note, incident-response report or victim account exists for this group, and the group itself has said nothing about its methods. The only evidence is its own leak site, captured by two trackers, and the directory listings behind seven of its ten download links. Those show what was taken and when it reached the group's server; they do not show how the group got in. Confidence in the intrusion method is LOW. [1][2][3] 

Initial foothold

How Curious Worm gets into its victims is not known. The group states no route for any of the ten listings: there is no claim of phishing, a software flaw, bought access or stolen credentials, and no vendor or victim has described an intrusion. What the stolen data shows is the level of access reached: whole file-server shares, department drives, exported mailboxes and, for one victim, full production database backups. Red Piranha assumes that the breach was due to a compromised internal account with administrator rights, most likely obtained through stolen or reused credentials on remote access such as a VPN, remote desktop or a remote-management tool; nothing confirms it. The concentration in US healthcare may reflect a shared supplier or simply the group's choice of targets. A tracker flags credentials exposed by information-stealing malware for three of the ten victim domains, which is a lead and not proof. Evidence: leak-server listings only; no route is stated or confirmed. [1][2] 

Evidence: leak-server listings only; no route is stated or confirmed. [1][2] 

Victim (sector, country) Route the group states What the stolen data points to (assessment) 
Senior-care provider, US 

None. 

Two full SQL Server backups (121 GB and 7 GB) whose names suggest document-management systems, plus pharmacy, accounting and fax file shares; fits administrator access to database and file servers. 

Orthopaedic practice, US 

None. 

About ninety department folders, including HR, payroll, medical records, patient lists and exported mailboxes; fits access to the main file server and mail. 

Senior-living operator, US 

None. 

Folders for IT, legal, community management and SQL data, loaded on the day it was listed; fits file-server and database access. 

Access and persistence

Nothing shows how the group keeps access or how long it stays. The leak-server dates give only timing. One victim's two database backups reached the server on 2 November, the larger with 25 October in its file name, and more of the same victim file shares arrived on 9 November. Red Piranha assessment: either the group still had access to that network a week after the first upload, or it uploaded in stages from data taken earlier. No backdoor, remote access tool, new account or tunnelling service is documented for any victim. Evidence: file names and time stamps on the leak server; no victim logs or responder findings. [1] 

Discovery

No scanning or enumeration tool is documented. The stolen sets show that the group took large stores of data: top-level file-server shares, department drives, database backups whose names suggest a document-management system, pharmacy and accounting shares, and HR and legal folders. [1] 

Collection and exfiltration

The group copies whole shares and databases and loads them onto the server behind its leak site. Each victim has a folder under a /storage/ path, served as an open directory listing, so the files can be browsed one by one. [1][2] 

Extortion

No demand is public. The leak site has no ransom figures, no deadline, no contact address, and no chat. No note, negotiation, or payment is known. [1][2][3] 

Evidence: the process is consistent across the leak site, the operator’s interview and tracker captures. No payment has been confirmed, and the claim of low-eight-figure ransoms is unverified.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

The mapping uses only what the group's own leak site and file server show. OBSERVED means seen there; ASSESSED means Red Piranha's inference from what is seen; NOT ESTABLISHED records a technique that was looked for and not evidenced. [1][2][3] 

TacticTechniqueEvidence decision
Resource Development 

T1583 Acquire Infrastructure (Tor leak site with file storage) 

OBSERVED (HIGH). Site titled 'CURIOUS WORM' captured by two trackers from 11 November; file storage loaded from 21 October. [1][2] 

Initial Access 

T1078 Valid Accounts; T1133 External Remote Services 

NOT ESTABLISHED. No route stated or reported; credential-based entry is an assessment only. [1][2] 

Collection 

T1039 Data from Network Shared Drive 

OBSERVED (MEDIUM). Leaked folders are named as file-server shares and department drives for seven victims. [1] 

Collection 

T1213 Data from Information Repositories (database backups) 

OBSERVED (MEDIUM). Two full SQL Server backups, 121 GB and 7 GB, in one victim folder. [1] 

Collection 

T1114 Email Collection 

OBSERVED (LOW). One victim's folder includes a set of exported mailboxes; contents not examined. [1] 

Exfiltration 

T1041 / T1567 (transfer channel) 

NOT ESTABLISHED. Data reached the group server; the route is unknown. [1] 

Impact 

T1657 Financial Theft (extortion) 

ASSESSED (MEDIUM). 'Leaked' status, release countdown in the page code and a vendor tracker's extortion label; no demand is public. [2][3] 

Impact 

T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact 

NOT ESTABLISHED. No sample, note, extension, or victim report. [1][2][3] 

Indicators and Contextual Observables

Every indicator below is specific to Curious Worm and comes from its own leak site as captured by trackers; the group has published no contact channel, clearnet domain or malware sample, so none is listed.

TypeDefanged value
Leak-site onion 

hhevzhgcokx6xlzh4o4exuo2kryy6ectpb7trm5ut2g3u4trskptv7ad[.]onion 

Leak-site page title 

CURIOUS WORM 

Download path 

/download/ (1 to 10 seen)

File-storage path 

/storage// served as an open directory listing titled 'Index of /storage//'

Leak-site onion 

hhevzhgcokx6xlzh4o4exuo2kryy6ectpb7trm5ut2g3u4trskptv7ad[.]onion 

Leak-site page title 

CURIOUS WORM 

Download path 

/download/ (1 to 10 seen)

 

Leak-Site Captures

 

Crystal Eye CE 6.0 Mitigation and Remediation

Curious Worm's listings show whole file shares, mailboxes and database backups leaving healthcare and professional-services networks, so the Crystal Eye controls that matter most are the ones that limit administrator and remote access, notice bulk copying from file and database servers, and catch data leaving. 

  • Lock down remote and administrator access - Install Vulnerability Scanning from the Marketplace (Compliance Controls > Vulnerability Scanning) and run overnight network scans for remote-desktop, VPN and remote-management services reachable from the internet; move any that must stay up behind the built-in SD-WAN WireGuard or SSL VPN with multi-factor authentication, using Advanced Firewall custom security zones, and record every administrator and service account with an owner in Risk Auditing (CIS Controls v8.1 IG-1). 
  • Notice bulk copying from file and database servers - Forward file-server and SQL Server audit logs through Incident and Event Services (SIEM, the log collection and correlation service) and use the Threat Hunt Dashboard to alert when one account reads whole shares or when a database server writes a full backup outside the normal backup window, the two behaviours the leaked folders point to. 

    Catch data leaving - Run Data Loss Protection in Alert or Reject mode for patient, HR and financial records, review Secure Web Gateway logs for large uploads from servers, and use Web Filter profiles to block anonymizer and proxy categories so that servers cannot reach Tor or file-transfer sites directly. 

Known Intelligence Gaps

No victim has confirmed an incident. Ten organisations are listed, and no statement, breach notice or press report about these listings was found for any of them by 13 November. The folders behind three of the ten download links were not captured by trackers, so their contents and dates are unknown. [1][2] 

The intrusion method is unknown. There is no malware sample, tool, ransom note, or vendor analysis, and the group has stated no route. The administrator-level access described here is an assessment based on folder names. [1][2][3] 

Identity and motive are open. The group has published no contact channel, demand or statement, so it is not settled whether it is a new extortion crew, a renamed one or a broker publishing data taken by others. Why one victim was also listed by another group in 2025 is unexplained. [3][5] 

Indicators are thin. Only the onion address and details of the leak page are known, and no security vendor flags the onion yet. The server clock being ahead of UTC is a setting, not proof of where the server or the operators are. [1][4] 

Source References

[1] Ransomware.live: Curious Worm group page, victim records and leak-server screenshots, retrieved 13 November 2026. https://www.ransomware.live/group/Curious%20Worm 

[2] RansomLook: Curious Worm group page and archived leak-site capture of 13 November 2026 07:00 UTC. https://www.ransomlook.io/group/curious%20worm 

[3] WatchGuard Ransomware Tracker: CURIOUS WORM entry, published 11 November 2026. https://www.watchguard.com/wgrd-security-hub/ransomware-tracker/curious-worm 

[4] VirusTotal: record for the group's onion address, retrieved 13 November 2026. https://www.virustotal.com/gui/domain/hhevzhgcokx6xlzh4o4exuo2kryy6ectpb7trm5ut2g3u4trskptv7ad.onion 

[5] Claim Depot: breach-notice summary for a US senior-care provider's 2025 incident. https://www.claimdepot.com/data-breach/marquis-companies-2025 

Details