
New Threat Detection Added | 2 - DoubleQlik and CONTEC CMS8000 Patient Monitor |
New Threat Protections | 186 |
Weekly Detected Threats
The following threats were added to Crystal Eye this week:
Threat name: | DoubleQlik | ||||||||||||||||||
In August 2023, Qlik released patches addressing two critical vulnerabilities in Qlik Sense Enterprise: CVE-2023-41265 and CVE-2023-41266. These vulnerabilities permitted unauthenticated remote code execution through path traversal and HTTP request tunnelling. Subsequent analysis by security researchers revealed that the initial fix for CVE-2023-41265 could be bypassed. Attackers could exploit this by manipulating the Transfer-Encoding header in HTTP requests, using variations like tchunked instead of chunked, to circumvent the patch's validation mechanism. This bypass allowed for unauthenticated remote code execution even on systems that had applied the original patch. Qlik has since issued a more robust patch to address this bypass, tracked as CVE-2023-48365. | |||||||||||||||||||
Threat Protected: | 01 | ||||||||||||||||||
Rule Set Type: |
| ||||||||||||||||||
Class Type: | Attempted Admin | ||||||||||||||||||
Kill Chain: |
|
Threat name: | CONTEC CMS8000 Patient Monitor | ||||||||||||||||||
In January 2025, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) issued alerts regarding potential cybersecurity vulnerabilities in CONTEC CMS8000 patient monitors. Initial concerns suggested the presence of a hidden backdoor communicating with a Chinese IP address. However, further analysis by researchers revealed that these issues stem from insecure design choices rather than malicious intent. The devices are configured to communicate with hardcoded public IP addresses (202.114.4.119 for the Central Management System and 202.114.4.120 for the HL7 server) for firmware updates and data transmission. This design exposes the monitors to potential unauthorised access and data leakage, posing significant risks to patient safety and data integrity. | |||||||||||||||||||
Threat Protected: | 02 | ||||||||||||||||||
Rule Set Type: |
| ||||||||||||||||||
Class Type: | Attempted-admin | ||||||||||||||||||
Kill Chain: |
|
Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (Week 1 - February 2025)
For more information, please visit the Red Piranha Forum:
https://forum.redpiranha.net/t/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog-1st-week-of-february-2025/544
Vulnerability | CVSS | Description | |
CVE-2018-19410 | 9.8 (Critical) | Paessler PRTG Network Monitor Local File Inclusion Vulnerability | |
CVE-2018-9276 | 7.2 (High) | Paessler PRTG Network Monitor OS Command Injection Vulnerability | |
CVE-2024-29059 | 7.5 (High) | Microsoft .NET Framework Information Disclosure Vulnerability | |
CVE-2024-45195 | 9.8 (Critical) | Apache OFBiz Forced Browsing Vulnerability | |
CVE-2024-53104 | 7.8 (High) | Linux Kernel Out-of-Bounds Write Vulnerability | |
CVE-2020-15069 | 9.8 (Critical) | Sophos XG Firewall Buffer Overflow Vulnerability | |
CVE-2020-29574 | 9.8 (Critical) | CyberoamOS (CROS) SQL Injection Vulnerability | |
CVE-2024-21413 | 9.8 (Critical) | Microsoft Outlook Improper Input Validation Vulnerability | |
CVE-2022-23748 | 7.8 (High) | Dante Discovery Process Control Vulnerability | |
CVE-2025-0411 | 7.0 (High) | 7-Zip Mark of the Web Bypass Vulnerability | |
CVE-2025-0994 | 8.6 (High) | Trimble Cityworks Deserialisation Vulnerability |
Updated Malware Signatures (Week 1 - February 2025)
Threat | Description | |
Lumma Stealer | A type of malware classified as an information stealer. Its primary purpose is to steal sensitive information from infected systems, including but not limited to credentials, financial information, browser data, and potentially other personal or confidential information. |
Ransomware Report | |
The Red Piranha Team conducts ongoing surveillance of the dark web and other channels to identify global organizations impacted by ransomware attacks. In the past week, our monitoring revealed multiple ransomware incidents across diverse threat groups, underscoring the persistent and widespread nature of these cyber risks. Presented below is a detailed breakdown of ransomware group activities during this period. | |
Name of Ransomware Group | Overall %age of total attack coverage |
Lynx | 3.82% |
Killsec3 | 1.53% |
1.53% | |
Leaked Data | 4.58% |
8Base | 3.05% |
Space Bears | 2.29% |
Wikileaksv2 | 2.29% |
Arcus Media | 3.82% |
1.53% | |
Abyss-data | 1.53% |
Handala | 0.76% |
Bianlian | 6.11% |
2.29% | |
2.29% | |
Ransomexx | 0.76% |
4.58% | |
11.45% | |
Qilin | 12.98% |
Cloak | 0.76% |
Eraleign (APT73) | 3.82% |
6.87% | |
3.05% | |
RansomHouse | 0.76% |
Cactus | 3.82% |
Cicada3301 | 3.05% |
Everest | 1.53% |
Kairos | 1.53% |
Fsociety | 1.53% |
3AM | 0.76% |
Stormous | 1.53% |
Akira | 2.29% |
Hunters | 0.76% |

Qilin Ransomware Group
Overview
The Red Piranha Team continuously monitors ransomware groups and underground cybercrime activity to track emerging threats. In recent investigations, we analysed a Qilin (Agenda) ransomware attack that leveraged VPN compromise, lateral movement, and advanced EDR evasion techniques to infiltrate corporate networks.
Qilin operates as a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS), allowing affiliates to conduct attacks in exchange for a large percentage of ransom payments. This particular attack showcased sophisticated kernel exploitation techniques, including a Bring-Your-Own-Vulnerable-Driver (BYOVD) attack to disable endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions at the deepest levels of the Windows operating system.
Attack Chain Analysis
Initial Access: VPN Compromise & Covert Network Tunnelling
- First session lasted over six hours; a second session occurred later for an additional hour and a half.
- Indicates compromised credentials or stolen session tokens, allowing the attacker to bypass MFA or other security controls.
- Bypass firewalls and internal security controls.
- Access internal machines remotely via RDP and other remote tools.
- Exfiltrate data through encrypted tunnels, making detection harder.
Privilege Escalation & Lateral Movement
After securing a foothold, the attacker expanded access within the network using:
- Logged into additional systems using compromised credentials.
- Avoided detection by mimicking legitimate user activity.
- Used PsExec and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to execute commands remotely.
- Reduced reliance on custom malware, making the attack harder to detect.
EDR Evasion: DLL Sideloading & Kernel Exploitation
Phase 1: DLL Sideloading Attack
- Normally, upd.exe loads a trusted DLL (avupdate.dll) for software updates.
- The attacker replaced this DLL with a malicious version, allowing them to execute arbitrary code.
- upd.exe executed avupdate.dll, which then:
- Loaded web.dat, an XOR-encoded payload containing a customised version of EDRSandblast, a known EDR-disabling tool.
- Performed anti-analysis checks to detect debuggers or virtual machines.
Phase 2: BYOVD Attack with TPwSav.sys
Instead of using a well-known vulnerable driver (which modern EDRs flag), the attacker introduced:
🔹 TPwSav.sys – A signed but vulnerable Windows driver originally developed for Toshiba laptop power-saving features.
- Compiled in 2015, still holds a valid signature.
- Allows direct kernel memory access.
- Undetected by most security solutions, unlike older exploited drivers.
Once loaded, the attacker hijacked the Windows Beep.sys driver, modifying its BeepDeviceControl function to execute malicious shellcode.
- Overwrote kernel memory to disable EDR hooks.
- Used MmMapIoSpace to read/write arbitrary memory.
- Hijacked IofCompleteRequest for kernel function execution.
- Removed kernel callback routines, cutting off EDR visibility.
- Disabled event tracing, blocking forensic tools from recording system activity.
Stage | Tactic | Technique | Description |
Initial Access | Valid Accounts (T1078) | Compromised VPN credentials | Used stolen credentials to log in via SSL VPN |
Execution | Command and Scripting Interpreter (T1059) | Remote execution via RDP and management tools | Used PsExec, WMIC for lateral movement |
Persistence | DLL Sideloading (T1574.002) | Malicious DLL sideloaded via upd.exe | upd.exe loaded avupdate.dll, leading to web.dat execution |
Privilege Escalation | Exploiting Vulnerable Drivers (T1068) | BYOVD attack with TPwSav.sys | Leveraged signed driver to disable EDR |
Defence Evasion | Disabling Security Tools (T1562.001) | Kernel callback removal & EDRSandblast execution | Killed EDR processes, disabled event tracing |
Impact | Data Encryption for Impact (T1486) | Ransomware execution | Exfiltrated data, encrypted critical files |
Mitigations Against Qilin Ransomware
- Enforce Strong VPN Security – Require Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) and geolocation-based restrictions to prevent unauthorised access.
- Monitor VPN & RDP Activity – Detect long-duration VPN sessions, logins from cloud-hosted IPs, and unusual RDP usage.
- Restrict RDP & Remote Access – Disable RDP where possible; otherwise, restrict by IP allowlists, enforce MFA, and limit admin privileges.
- Implement Network Segmentation – Prevent lateral movement by isolating critical systems and enforcing least privilege access.
- Use Endpoint Detection & Response (EDR) Policies – Deploy behaviour-based anomaly detection to identify suspicious process executions.
- Block Vulnerable Drivers (BYOVD Protection) – Enable Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) and Hypervisor-Protected Code Integrity (HVCI) to block outdated or unsigned drivers.
- Harden Privileged Account Usage – Implement Privileged Access Management (PAM) and just-in-time (JIT) access to limit admin rights.
- Disable Unnecessary Windows Services & Tools – Block execution of PsExec, WMIC, PowerShell, and other remote admin tools where not needed.
IOCs
Hashes
IP:
File servers
DLS URLs
Ransomware Victims Worldwide
A recent ransomware analysis reveals that the United States remains the most heavily impacted nation, accounting for a staggering 66.41% of global incidents, highlighting its continued vulnerability to ransomware threats. Following this, Canada reported 10.69% of the attacks, emerging as another highly targeted region.
India and the United Kingdom also faced considerable exposure, reporting 3.05% and 3.82% of ransomware incidents, respectively. Italy experienced 2.29% of attacks, indicating an ongoing risk in the region. Meanwhile, Sweden recorded 1.53% of global ransomware cases.
Several other nations exhibited moderate levels of ransomware incidents, including Singapore, Brazil, Israel, Turkey, China, Mexico, Germany, Jamaica, Saudi Arabia, Switzerland, France, Australia, South Korea, Netherlands, and Japan, each reporting 0.76% of global ransomware cases.
This analysis underscores the persistent and widespread nature of ransomware attacks, with North America facing particularly high levels of risk. These findings highlight the critical need for robust cybersecurity measures, proactive defence strategies, and heightened vigilance across all sectors to counteract the increasing ransomware threat worldwide.

Ransomware Victims by Industry
A recent ransomware analysis highlights the Manufacturing sector as the most targeted industry, accounting for 21.37% of total reported incidents. This underscores the persistent threats faced by production processes and supply chain operations.
Following this, the Retail and Business Services sectors each reported 10.69% of attacks, emphasising the heightened risk to consumer-facing businesses and service-oriented organisations. The Hospitality industry also saw a significant impact, accounting for 8.4% of ransomware incidents.
Other heavily affected industries include Construction and IT, each reporting 6.11%, reflecting ongoing security challenges in infrastructure development and technology services. Education and Transportation both recorded 4.58% of attacks, followed closely by Law Firms at 4.58% and Healthcare at 3.82%, highlighting vulnerabilities in sectors handling sensitive data.
Meanwhile, Finance and Federal institutions each accounted for 2.29% of reported ransomware incidents. Energy also faced 2.29%, indicating cybercriminals' focus on critical infrastructure. Telecommunications, Insurance, and Media & Internet sectors each saw 1.53% of attacks, while Real Estate reported 5.34%, underscoring the diverse impact of ransomware across industries.
Lower, yet notable, shares of ransomware activity were recorded in Agriculture (0.76%) and Organisations (0.76%), showcasing the widespread reach of ransomware across sectors.
This analysis reinforces the indiscriminate nature of ransomware threats, impacting industries across critical infrastructure, public services, and commercial enterprises. The findings highlight the urgent need for sector-specific cybersecurity strategies, robust defences, and proactive risk management to mitigate the evolving ransomware landscape.
